REPORT
HIGH-LEVEL MEETING ON THE YEMEN NATIONAL DIALOGUE
BEIRUT, 11-12 JUNE 2014

Summary

The High-level Meeting on the Yemen National Dialogue was held in Beirut, on 11 and 12 June 2014. The meeting was attended by ministers, deputies, senior officials and activists from Yemen, to discuss all social, political and economic pillars as framed by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative which, in November 2011, led to the formation of a Government of national unity; a Military Committee for Establishing Safety and Security; the election of a new president; constitutional and electoral reform; and the National Dialogue Conference. The aim was to limit the risk of State collapse and a slide towards civil war, and discuss Arab experiences in specific areas that might pose challenges in the implementation of the decisions reached at the National Dialogue Conference.

Participants emphasized the need to follow up the meeting by assessing the guarantees put forward by participants at the National Dialogue Conference. They also stressed the importance of holding future meetings that would bring together representatives of the political and social components of the National Dialogue Conference, to discuss possible measures to facilitate political transition and implementation of the National Dialogue outcomes. They also affirmed the importance of promoting economic and political development.

Participants discussed the agenda items and shared their opinions and views. The present report summarizes the main discussions and issues raised.
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Introduction

1. The Arab uprisings began in December 2010 and quickly spread to a number of Arab countries, including Yemen. Demonstrators focused on the issues of equity, respect for human rights, rotation of power, corruption, accountability, political participation and social justice, including the political, social and economic rights of citizens. However, their demands went beyond the need for democratic governance, free and fair elections and civil rights; young people wanted a modern State that would fully uphold democracy, thus ensuring good governance, accountability, freedom, dignity and socioeconomic development.

2. The socioeconomic and political tensions in Yemen brought the country to the brink of civil strife and communal violence. However, in November 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative and the subsequent implementation mechanisms led to the formation of a Government of national unity and a Military Committee for Establishing Safety and Security; the election of a new president; agreement on constitutional and electoral reform; and the National Dialogue Conference. The National Dialogue strove to reduce the risk of civil war and avoid protests descending into armed clashes; the aim was to drive the country and political and social forces towards an alternative political path, which was no mean feat. It also sought a solution despite the difficulties that the country was facing; a commendable experience for Yemenis and for Arab and international supporters of the process, which merits detailed analysis.

3. Among the Arab States that witnessed a political and institutional change over the period 2011-2013, Yemen was the only country that began by holding a National Dialogue, thus paving the way for constitutional, electoral and institutional processes. Following the National Dialogue, constitutional and electoral procedures must begin to implement its decisions and establish a State and government institutions founded on the new social contract agreed by Yemenis. In this process, Yemen could learn from the experiences of other countries that have followed the same path.

4. To create a platform for Yemeni participants to interact and share their views on how to achieve the tasks identified in the outcome document of the National Dialogue, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) organized the High-level Meeting on the Yemen National Dialogue, at the request of the Government of Yemen and in collaboration with the International Labour Organization and the Common Space Initiative. The Meeting brought together key governmental and non-governmental actors in the National Dialogue, embassy representatives of ESCWA member States and other countries, and experts and stakeholders from Arab countries that have experience in national dialogue and political transition.

I. RECOMMENDATIONS

5. The High-level Meeting concluded with a number of recommendations for Governments, the United Nations and the international community. The principal recommendations adopted by the participants were as follows:

(a) To call upon all parties that have taken part in the National Dialogue to continue their efforts in implementing the National Dialogue outcomes and mobilizing the grass roots towards that end;

(b) To form a bloc, representing all political and social groups, to serve as a social and political incubator for the Dialogue outcomes and ensure their implementation;

(c) To focus on overlooked developmental and socioeconomic issues, rather than just political issues, in collaboration with international and regional parties supporting Yemen;

(d) To proceed with consensus to cement the Dialogue pillars and guarantee the implementation of its outcomes. Although conditions for real competition are required for the upcoming elections, good governance cannot be established without broad coalitions and avoiding singularity;
(e) To emphasize the importance of dialogue and the political process, and reject any form of violence;

(f) To call upon ESCWA to follow developments in Yemen, provide necessary support and organize meetings and workshops, when necessary, to effectively implement the Dialogue outcomes.

II. TOPICS OF DISCUSSION

Session I: Opening

6. The meeting opened with a speech by Ms. Rima Khalaf, United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of ESCWA. She welcomed the intellectual and political participants from Yemen, praised the achievements of the National Dialogue and indicated that any future success would depend on the ability to translate ideas and recommendations into actions. She also stressed the need for a legislative, constitutional and electoral process founded on the National Dialogue outcomes and consensus, so that the will of stronger parties and the authorities would not be imposed on society.

7. Mr. Ali Ahmed El Dailmi, Ambassador of Yemen to Lebanon, noted that Yemen was establishing a new State where all citizens could enjoy freedom and justice, participate politically and share the country's wealth, despite the challenges and difficulties facing the country. He added that national security and stability could not be achieved without the participation of all Yemenis. He praised the GCC initiative, its implementation mechanisms and the role of GCC and other countries in its successful execution.

8. Mr. Abdel Karim al-Eryani, Foreign Policy Advisor to the President of Yemen and former Prime Minister, highlighted the role of the GCC initiative and its implementation mechanisms in limiting the risks of State collapse. He pointed out that the history of Yemen had been marked for centuries by clashes but there had always been recourse to dialogue and reconciliation.

Session II: Overall Context of the National Dialogue, Outcomes and Challenges

9. The second session was chaired by Mr. Adib Nehmeh, ESCWA Regional Advisor. He said that the session aimed at defining the overall context of the National Dialogue and the main challenges faced, and would pave the way for a detailed discussion in following sessions. He also noted that speakers would address the context, outcomes and challenges of the National Dialogue from governmental and human rights perspectives.

10. Ms. Huria Mashhur, Yemeni Minister of Human Rights, focused on three pivotal issues, namely youth participation; women’s participation in the National Dialogue; and the role of the Ministry of Human Rights, government actions and the relationship between the Government and the National Dialogue. She noted that young people had rejected the political path as they had assumed that political forces had deceived them and betrayed the uprising, but they were now convinced that it was the safest path to their desired reforms. Presidential elections had been held and youth groups, along with various other political forces, had participated in the peaceful handover of power. This had been the start of the acceptance process. A ministerial committee had been established to communicate with young people, which faced many challenges and disputes, but an overall consensus had been reached. Young people considered that they had been a force for change and they wanted to participate in State-building and in achieving stability, development and peace. They had held many meetings and concluded with recommendations for consideration at the National Dialogue.

11. She added that great focus had been placed in National Dialogue discussions on the political sphere, a 30 per cent women’s representation rate in all decision-making processes and public life, and issues related to social rights, economic participation and early marriage.
12. She praised the role that the media had played in informing the Yemeni public about all National Dialogue developments, despite interference by some political forces. She indicated that, despite the contribution of the GCC initiative to the success of the National Dialogue, armed groups still posed a threat, some of which had participated in the National Dialogue and should commit to its outcomes to secure peace, independence and development; armed conflict was the main obstacle to implementing the National Dialogue outcomes.

13. She commended the role of the Ministry of Human Rights saying that, if the Government (as a key stakeholder in the planning process) had not been fully represented at the National Dialogue, the problem had been rectified with guidance from the President, the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Human Rights.

14. Mr. Mohamed al-Mekhlafi, Minister of Legal Affairs, began by highlighting the success of the National Dialogue in terms of organization and outcomes. He said that participation in the Dialogue had been distinctive, given that it had included parties not formerly recognized or integrated in decision-making processes, such as women, young people and marginalized groups. It had also established a voting mechanism preventing political parties from making unilateral decisions and garnered unprecedented international support from the United Nations and GCC.

15. He said that some entities were hindering the implementation of the National Dialogue outcomes. The Government had ratified a number of international conventions on human rights and transitional justice, which remained unaddressed by national entities, hinting at the House of Representatives. He also tackled the guarantees document regarding the implementation of the Dialogue outcomes, which contained political guarantees and legal implementation mechanisms. The document highlighted the importance of continuous support from the international community for the political process.

16. He added that the international community, despite its fundamental role, was far from fulfilling its commitments. Regarding the legal mechanism, the guarantees document stated that consensus should be maintained until elections were held. Thus, all decisions made should be compatible with the consensus ruling the National Dialogue, the initiative agreed upon, the transfer of power and the completion of the transition process until the elections. He said that this process had a strong legal foundation, meaning that any party that violated the consensus or hindered the implementation of the National Dialogue outcomes would be breaching its terms.

17. He suggested a number of solutions, including effecting a change in Government and local authorities and establishing a national authority for monitoring constitution drafting and adoption, and implementing the Dialogue outcomes, namely the National Authority for Monitoring the Implementation of the National Dialogue Conference Outcomes; the only body authorized to implement the outcomes as the successor of the National Dialogue.

18. He said that Yemen needed an enabling consensual environment for the implementation of the outcomes, which required a solid political and societal bloc to support the project. He expressed his hope that this would be achieved soon and that Yemen would overcome its historical impasse.

19. Mr. Ahmed bin Mubarak, Secretary-General of the National Dialogue Conference of Yemen and Director of the Presidential Office, commended the positive role played by the GCC initiative in achieving and supporting Yemeni consensus and mitigating economic, security and political challenges. He also praised the pivotal role of the United Nations in this context.

20. He indicated that a liaison committee had been established, headed by Mr. Abdel Karim Eleryani and a cadre of the main political parties in Yemen. The committee had organized several meetings with all parties that had not participated in the GCC initiative. A technical committee had then been formed to prepare for the National Dialogue, comprising parties that had not traditionally participated in the political process. Key issues had been identified and discussed, including the way forward to avoid repeating the same mistakes in the future. Participants had addressed several issues, including child marriage,
comprehensive and integrated development, good governance, independence of the authorities, the military, security issues, the governorate of Saada, State-building, and rights and freedoms.

21. He noted that some had attempted to realize goals not achieved at the National Dialogue through violence or political blackmail. However, the political will governing the pre-Dialogue phase was solid and able to secure change, although some had doubted that it would succeed.

**DISCUSSIONS**

22. Mr. Eleryani said that, despite all obstacles, consensus should persist until the upcoming parliamentary elections, and questioned whether one party would be ruling after the elections. He stressed that the upcoming elections must be democratic and parties should be encouraged to submit their manifestos, and the importance of the continuous commitment to preserve consensus until the national dialogue outcomes were implemented and to consolidate social cohesion until the election results were announced. Without consensus, one or two parties could not rule, even if they secured a majority. He praised the role of the new groups mentioned by Mr. Mubarak and emphasized the need to respect the constitution.

23. The Chargé d’affaires of the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates commended the GCC initiative, which had encouraged Yemenis to sit at the same table and represent Yemen. He emphasized that his country and the GCC countries supported the initiative to build a modern Yemen, which had been the centre of the ancient Arab civilization.

24. The Ambassador of Egypt emphasized his support for the significant and distinctive results of the National Dialogue and stressed the need to determine the internal obstacles faced by the National Dialogue; the investigation of the Commission of Inquiry into events that had taken place and its role in facilitating consensus and following up on outcome implementation; the entity in charge of following up on the implementation in the future; and society’s ability to bear economic difficulties during the transition period. In that context, he urged the international community to provide the necessary support.

25. Mr. Mahmud Ataya, representative of the Palestinian Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development, said that change in Yemen had been fuelled by feelings of discrimination and marginalization. Past change in Palestine had led to fragmentation, conflict and social division, therefore a mechanism was needed to tackle such change. He also questioned methods for assessing the role of the international community in supporting or hampering the Dialogue process in Yemen, given that the Palestinian Cause still polarized the international community.

26. A member of the National Dialogue said that the Dialogue had succeeded in theory but it was necessary to implement its outcomes in practice to achieve stability.

27. A Member of Parliament defended the Yemeni Parliament, saying that it should remain until new elections were held in accordance with the new constitution and election law. He also commended the National Dialogue, hoping that all challenges would be overcome, and thanked the GCC initiative for supporting the Dialogue.

**MAIN INTERVENTIONS**

28. Ms. Mashur said that Parliament was hindering the passing of some laws, such as the law prohibiting weapons, as there was no justification for any group to carry weapons, in addition to loan and grant agreements; a counter-terrorism law; and a protocol against trafficking in persons. She highlighted the alarming economic situation, saying that 1 million children in Yemen were vulnerable and suffered from malnutrition, and a large number of displaced persons were suffering from hunger because of the conflict. She added that the economic portfolio had not been effectively reviewed and that the bodies tasked with combating corruption were inefficient, noting that these issues were the Government’s responsibility.
29. Mr. Al-Mekhlafi indicated that the bodies tasked with combating corruption and the Shura Council were part of the previous regime, therefore new bodies had been established to access grants from the World Bank and other donors. However, following their establishment, a support system had not been implemented, so grants had not been awarded. A year and a half later, agreement had not been reached on who should manage the economy, and the international community had not yet taken a decision to provide economic support to Yemen.

30. Mr. Bin Mubarak said that Yemen was facing the following two challenges: commitments of donor States were insufficient and were not being fulfilled; and undertakings and economic reforms were not being implemented because of political polarization. Adopting a new constitution was therefore vital.

**Session III: Guarantees for the implementation of the National Dialogue outcomes**

31. The session was headed by Mr. Obaid Briki, representative of the International Labour Organization. He said that engaging all groups was the first step towards successfully implementing the Dialogue outcomes, especially in view of the conditions in countries that had witnessed uprisings. Experience had shown that dialogue reduced tensions among communities. Following the success of those uprisings, political parties had sought to make their mark, causing disputes that were sometimes led by personal interests and a complex situation that could only be resolved through consensus. Civil society played an important role, because its relationship with the authorities was different to that of parties. He added that it was an exaggeration to say the Dialogue had been completely successful when Yemenis were suffering from high poverty rates, with informal employment reaching 70 per cent, weak social protection systems, group interest overriding collective ones and disagreement on outcome implementation. He stressed that the solution was to move towards the social dimension of a democratic society by establishing social justice and implementing the National Dialogue outcomes.

32. Ms. Nadia Kokabani, Member of the National Dialogue Conference of Yemen, said that it was necessary to tackle the failures and challenges that arose at the Dialogue and the lack of popular acceptance and interaction with the National Dialogue, including from the Technical Committee. She presented the initial twenty points and the additional eleven points tackled by the National Dialogue, which were added for citizens to understand the Dialogue. However, those 20 points had not been implemented, exacerbating the situation for individuals and society. She commended the Guarantee Committee that had represented all components and actors and had worked continuously for three days to develop the guarantees, which had been immediately breached in practice. She added that political consensus could not exist separately from social consensus, and religious and sectarian issues should not overshadow citizens' lives and livelihoods.

33. Mr. Youssuf al-Kuraimi, Secretary-General of Youssuf Business Club in Yemen, reviewed the guarantees for the implementation of the National Dialogue outcomes, namely national ownership whereby all citizens felt a sense of ownership of the National Dialogue document; realism, given that the National Dialogue had been laden with more than it could bear and had become a platform for aggrieved persons, which was necessary but should be tackled realistically; and parallelism, because there was a need to work in parallel rather than focus on the 20 points and 11 issues. He said that the National Dialogue outcomes should therefore be implemented along with the work of the Constitution Drafting Committee and the Guarantee Committee. He added that the National Dialogue outcomes provided a road map and a State-building plan, stressing the need to address challenges and difficulties at the start of the implementation process. It was also necessary to ensure that the implementation process had the required capabilities and mechanisms to succeed.

**DISCUSSIONS**

34. One participant said that it was absolutely necessary to implement the 20 points and 11 issues. With regard to one of the points related to transitional justice and apologizing for past injustices, the Government had apologized on behalf of the former regime to the people of the south for the 1944 war and to the people of the Saada Governorate for the Saada wars. Two committees had been formed to enhance the transitional
justice process, one to address the issue of stolen land and the other to handle the issue of dismissed employees in the southern governorates. A fund had also been established to guarantee the implementation of the outcomes but it had encountered a legal problem with the United Nations; the fund would be managed by the United Nations Population Fund. He added that other issues included in the 20 points had been referred to the House of Representatives but remained pending.

35. Another participant noted that many parties would benefit from a failure to implement the National Dialogue outcomes. People had considered the National Dialogue as an executive organ that could resolve the various outstanding issues that the authorities should have tackled. The focus should be on incorporating the outcomes into the constitution and implementing them.

36. One participant said that civil society should observe and participate in the implementation of the outcomes and the private sector should provide job opportunities for a large number of graduates from universities and technical institutes. He stressed the importance of addressing the economic situation by fighting corruption and money laundering. He added that civil society was morally responsible for protecting social groups suffering from deprivation because their money had been stolen.

37. Another participant said that it was extremely important to benefit from the assistance provided by ESCWA and other organizations, rather than dwelling on past failures.

38. Participants agreed that harmony between the President and Government was a vital guarantee. They praised the efforts of the National Dialogue and stressed the importance of the next phase. They noted that, when the outcomes were approved, the Conciliation Commission had not managed to unify opinions and amend the documents, which would be done by the Constitution Drafting Committee.

39. Participants raised several questions on the size and authority of political forces that had no interest in implementing the Dialogue outcomes; the involvement of grass root Yemenis in the political process and whether they were ready to revolt again; and the role of neighbouring countries in the success of the Dialogue.

Session IV: Institutional transition towards democracy and State-building

40. Mr. Khaled al-Obali, member to the State-building team, said that the National Dialogue Conference had been a great opportunity for Yemen to preserve its unity, security and stability. Disarmament and peaceful action had been undertaken to pave the way to the Dialogue. The United Nations had played an important role in bringing political parties, young demonstrators, civil society organizations and other segments of society closer together. He added that the Dialogue had been the first inclusive participatory, consensual and interactive experience in terms of preparation and planning for the future of Yemen. However, the National Dialogue had raised some disagreements and challenges, including how to resolve the south issue and its representation, as well as the form of the State in the future. Security Council resolutions issued before, during and after the Dialogue on resolving the crisis were tantamount to messages to certain internal and external parties that had been trying to hamper the Dialogue and its outcomes. Despite the challenges of the National Dialogue in view of internal and external disputes, Yemenis were able, through their wisdom and will, to draft a new social contract to be enshrined in their new constitution.

41. In terms of the phases and challenges of the National Dialogue, he said that the Conference had been tantamount to a miracle; parties had been preparing for confrontation but instead they faced each other at the negotiating table, initiating the national reconciliation process that would continue through the various entities and committees. He added that political disagreement was normal, but reconciliation was vital, supported by national and political alliances. While many challenges remained at all levels, including institution-building and restructuring, the National Dialogue had established the basis for developing solutions.
42. Mr. Ali Assarari, member of the National Dialogue, said that dividing Yemen into six regions, including two in the south, would not resolve the problem, questioning the criteria on which the division had been based, and whether it was appropriate to divide the south into two regions or should it be recognized as a political entity and State partner, especially given that a large portion of its population considered themselves marginalized and voiceless. It was therefore necessary to address the issue of State-building on the basis of full partnership between the south and north. He added that the majority of northern parties doubted that the south would continue to support unity, and the majority of southern parties mistrusted the intention of northern parties. It was therefore pertinent to address that lack of confidence by implementing the 20 points to allay suspicion in the South.

43. He argued that it was necessary to review the issue of dividing the country into regions and identify concrete and practical steps by priority, to address the main problems in Yemen.

**DISCUSSION**

44. In the ensuing discussion, participants questioned the Dialogue guarantees in view of the deteriorating economic and security situation and threat of hunger, after a large number of employees had been laid off. They agreed that the main guarantee was the faith of the Yemeni population in their ownership of the National Dialogue outcomes and contents of its document. They requested State and private media to unify their discourse, find practical solutions to implement the agreed points and communicate them to the public in a constructive way to build a better independent State.

45. They inquired about the convictions of civil society organizations, the General Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, political parties and other components regarding the need for change and a new State, which could not be achieved without developing civil society organizations and the private sector.

46. They said that the National Dialogue Conference had been held to address the south issue by implementing the 20 points; however, nothing had been implemented. It was important to fulfil commitments to avoid aggravating citizens. The aim was to draft a new constitution that clearly reflected the National Dialogue outcomes. They added that the division of the Yemen into six regions was an undesirable issue that needed to be tackled.

47. They warned of the failure to address the south issue completely, given that it was considered the biggest and hardest challenge in the southern governorates; political forces should unite and commit to implementing all the Dialogue outcomes. They said that government performance had engendered many problems; a new government should be formed to oversee the transition towards the adoption and implementation of a new federal State constitution.

**MAIN INTERVENTIONS**

48. With regard to the new constitution and the powers of the Technical Committee, Mr. Al-Mekhlafi pointed out that the Committee’s mandate should be governed by constitutional limitations. He added that the implementation of the outcomes had been delegated to the National Committee, not the Constitutional Drafting Committee, through the following two determinants: the general framework represented by the outcomes as a whole that could not be derogated from; and the main issues of the constitution, mainly the form of the State, electoral law, the newly approved presidential system and the type of economic and legal systems. He also emphasized that the issue of dividing the State into regions should be addressed through consensus with the south.

49. Mr. Ali Assarari responded to questions on readiness to take to the streets and defend the National Dialogue. He argued that the vast majority of Yemenis and elites not affiliated to the Government had lost faith in the Dialogue. He added that if the Dialogue were to succeed, Yemen would become a democratic country, and neighbouring countries might see that as a threat to their own political systems.
50. Mr. Bin Mubarak clarified that the south issue had been discussed in detail at the National Dialogue Conference and following it; participants had unanimously agreed to establish a federal State, delegate all powers to the Region Determination Committee and to identify regions in a non-arbitrary manner. The Committee had taken 11 days to be established; detailed discussions regarding the south had begun simultaneously with the National Dialogue Conference and papers had been submitted by all parties. When the region determination document had been submitted, it wrongly stated that the 7 July Alliance had been re-established. He expressed his hope that the proposed solutions would be implemented.

51. Mr. Adib Nehmeh concluded the session by saying that consensus had been reached on the National Dialogue outcomes; however, the details and implementation mechanisms required further discussion.

Session V: Exchanging Arab expertise

52. Mr. Obaid Briki summarized the proceedings of the first day of the National Dialogue Conference; its challenges, outcomes and implementation guarantees; and questions on overcoming the obstacles and barriers hindering the implementation of its outcomes. He compared the Yemeni and Tunisian experiences, arguing that it was important to underscore the Tunisian transition experience and the role of political parties and civil society in it.

53. Mr. Mohamed Belkasem, representative of the Tunisian General Union of Labour (UGTT), discussed the Union’s experience. He said that the peaceful demonstrations and movements had resulted from the old constitution, which stated that the Speaker of Parliament should take over the presidency of the country and request the Prime Minister to form a new Government; a new President would then be elected two months later. Protesters argued that this process was simply a placatory tactic that would reinstate the ruling regime under a new guise. The Tunisian uprisings had not been led by political parties but rather by marginalized and unemployed young people, especially in underdeveloped areas. Given that those peaceful protests had no connection to political parties, trade unionists were the first to support them. The protests developed into general strikes led by UGTT, leading to the resignation of the President. Lawyers and other civil society components had also played a significant role in supporting these movements.

54. Political parties had finally come to an agreement and, with the assistance of civil society, formed the High Authority for the Achievement of the Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic Transition, comprising representatives from opposition parties, key organizations, civil society and prominent national figures. Elections had been held on 23 October 2011. It had been the first dialogue experience bringing together all factions to discuss the country’s future. However, the election had resulted in tensions among those elected and the general public. The conflict had taken on ideological and political characteristics and a large number of enthusiastic young people had been mobilized and motivated to resort to verbal abuse and violence.

55. As a result, the economy had suffered significantly. To rescue the country, the first dialogue initiative had been launched and implemented through the UGTT national administrative commission. More than 50 associations and 70 parties participated. However, an assassination had taken place for the first time in the post-colonial era, followed by another, which led to a major conflict between political parties, associations and civil society on the one hand, and the isolated ruling coalition on the other hand. The opposition had called for the National Constituent Assembly to be dissolved and the Government to resign. Demonstrations had erupted again and UGTT played a major role in calming the situation by defending the need for a National Constituent Assembly elected by the people until the promulgation of a new constitution. Nevertheless, it had called for the Government’s resignation because the unrest had taken place under its leadership. The General Union initiative had been adopted by three main civil society organizations, namely the Tunisian Federation of Industry and Commerce, the National Bar Association and the Tunisian League of Human Rights. It had evolved from a trade union initiative to an umbrella initiative of four organizations supporting national dialogue. That mechanism had succeeded in uniting political parties and developing a new constitution supported by political parties and the majority of Tunisian people.
56. Mr. Slaheddine Jourchi, a journalist for the Haqa’iq newspaper, reviewed the main political aspects of the National Dialogue. He argued that the Tunisian revolution had not been planned by politicians; young people had ousted the President and politicians filled the gap. The National Dialogue had not been pre-empted; it had been imposed by a political crisis. The National Dialogue had not simply been a discussion on general ideas and principles; it had rapidly developed a road map and identified practical steps that had been agreed upon as major principles, whose details needed to be fleshed out.

57. He argued that the quadrilateral union had taken the right decision when it refused to dissolve the National Constituent Assembly, because an institutional vacuum should be avoided at all cost. That had facilitated the transition form a political to a technocratic Government. The Dialogue had been divided into a political level and an economic level. Priority had been given to institutions, thus facilitating the dialogue process and providing more opportunities for agreement upon specific issues. A consensus committee had been formed comprising the main political parties to facilitate dialogue with the National Constituent Assembly that considered itself responsible for leading the Dialogue, rather than political parties. The Consensus Committee contributed to resolving that problem and argued that any decision taken by the National Dialogue should be supported by the National Constituent Assembly. He also noted that some factions did not want the Dialogue to succeed. However, the quadrilateral union indicated that it would spread the truth and identify responsibilities, which facilitated the consensus process.

DISCUSSIONS

58. One participant compared the Yemeni and Tunisian experiences, noting that Tunisian strengths had been reflected in the fact that the State had been a powerful institution that had monopolized power legitimately and illegitimately. Unlike in Yemen, it had been civil society, not political parties, that had taken centre stage. In Yemen, civil society did not effectively influence decision-making. Moreover, the military in Tunisia had maintained its unity and played a major role in preventing the country’s collapse, which had not been the case in Yemen.

59. Another participant argued that the Tunisian experience was marked by the election of a national council that had worked on the formulation of a new constitution, in contrast to Yemen. Similarities between Tunisia and Yemen were limited to the existence of parties aiming to hinder progress through assassinations. Tunisians had succeeded in quelling such plans and Yemenis should do the same. The challenges facing both countries were the same, namely discredited Government; security; and the adoption of the Egyptian approach to assassinating trusted leaders to create confusion. The main difference between the two countries was the issue of national identity, which remained problematic in Yemen.

60. Another participant said that trade and youth unions had played a prominent role. In Tunisia, trade union leaders had been aware and responsible, enabling them to play a vital part in the uprisings. He questioned how Tunisia had succeeded to secure such leadership in a dictatorship, and said that the General Federation of Trade Unions in Yemen had not played a role in the uprisings because most unions had been affiliated to the ruling regime. He advised Yemenis to pursue a consensual democracy as in Tunisia, because numerical democracy had many disadvantages.

61. One participant said that each revolution had its own path and characteristics. He also tackled the concept of legitimacy, which had become problematic in the transitional phase, its stability and conditions. He also wondered when stability would return to the streets.

62. Another participants argued that the economy was a major challenge regardless of the success or failure of transition. Economic problems played a key role in hindering positive change, causing some protesters to abandon their aspirations, believing that the situation had been better in the past, due to illiteracy and lack of awareness.
MAIN SPEAKERS’ RESPONSES

63. Mr. Slaheddine Jourchi said that Tunisians were worried about hard-line ideologies dominating the political scene, especially given that certain Islamist groups wanted to reignite ideological struggle in Tunisia. He added that the State was a constant for all political factions, reflected in the absence of disagreement on the presidential system and reinforced by the constitution; the conflict revolved around power and who should hold it. No political party in Tunisia could monopolize power or win an absolute majority; therefore Tunisia would be always governed by coalitions.

64. Mr. Mohammad Belkasem said that the Union and the Federation were two national bodies concerned with public affairs. Defending physical demands without defending human dignity and freedom was a waste of time. The Union had been the only body to submit a socioeconomic programme to the first Government elected after independence but it had faced many challenges. Dictatorship, political repression and a ban on forming political parties meant that political groups’ only outlet had been the Union, which had included rightist and leftist groups that had respected the organization and its regulations and unity. The restlessness among Tunisians had been caused by the al-Nahda party using its numerical majority to determine the country’s future for decades to come, and the constitution had not been amended following elections and the formation of new Governments. Thus, the unrest was not an objection to the election of al-Nahda, but to the erosion of the recent gains achieved by Tunisian society.

65. Mr. Obaid Briki said that the Tunisian media had played a major role in promoting dialogue although journalists had suffered insults and violence. There were several mechanisms, a constitution, an independent electoral commission elected by the Constituent Assembly and the Truth and Dignity Commission elected to follow up any breaches and violations. The elections would take place and Governments would be directly elected by the Tunisian people, thus reducing tensions. He added that there was a split between those aspiring for change through social movements, and those opposing change and trying to convince people of the disadvantages and negative outcomes of the Arab uprisings. Some groups had adopted the latter approach and were resorting to terrorism and intimidation, causing a social reaction.

Session VI: Consensus following the National Dialogue

66. Mr. Adib Nehmeh began his intervention by clarifying the theme of the session, which was consensus following the National Dialogue. He said that it was vital to implement the 20 and 11 points and other issues related to transitional justice, especially institutional, legislative and practical procedures to facilitate the implementation of the Dialogue outcomes. Institutions should be founded on widespread public and political acceptance, because sharp polarization would hamper their role.

67. Mr. Ali Ashal argued that Yemen was in dire need of political consensus to see it through the next phase. Yemen was facing major challenges and Yemenis were not adequately prepared to face the difficulties of the next phase, whose challenges would determine the nature and outcomes of the National Dialogue related to the political system and its existing tools, parties and political forces. He added that the Executive Authority and State institutions remained a serious challenge in the implementation of the National Dialogue outcomes.

68. He said that the National Dialogue had succeed given that it had resulted in those outcomes. However, political forces did not support people’s aspirations to reach the desired goals of the National Dialogue outcomes. Another challenge was the political power of some armed groups in Yemen, which hampered the National Dialogue and its outcomes. Other issues were related to the National Dialogue outcomes and recommendations that remained a serious burden for the Constitution Drafting Committee because of overlapping outcomes that required consensus to avoid future problems.

69. He argued that the weakness of the National Dialogue was the roadmap that clarified entitlements, but was only tackled in the framework of the guarantee document. He also admitted that the consensus was
a significant challenge for the National Dialogue and political forces that participated in the Dialogue should participate in the implementation of the outcomes. However, consensus should not damage the democratic process because some parties might consider political consensus as a postponement of some entitlements, especially the democratic process represented by the election, which might be extremely dangerous. Thus, it was very important to promote consensus on the course of the democratic process. He also highlighted the economic challenge of the failure of some countries to meet their commitments to close the financial gap.

70. Mr. Ali Nasser El Bkyty highlighted the advantages of the National Dialogue given that it had brought together warring factions, not only the political elite, which resulted in a comprehensive dialogue engaging all civil society organizations. New factions attended the Dialogue and, because of the large number of participants, it was impossible to tackle all interests. In addition, the media had made a good impression and effectively engaged public opinion and the cultural elite in the conference.

71. He also argued that the outcomes were not based on broad consensus. The voting process had followed the traditional way of the House of Representatives, entailing raising hands without counting votes. As a result, parties that did not participate to the National Dialogue had questioned and criticized the outcomes. He also tackled problematic issues that faced the National Dialogue and the way the sessions were moderated as the most important issues were cancelled, postponed, circumvented or converted to the post-Discussion file, such as the issue of regions (south and Saada issues). That was the result of the failure to establish a committee based on consensus, which constituted the basis of the National Dialogue. Consequently, the political process lost its momentum and citizens felt confused and considered that the Dialogue did not meet their aspirations. Thus, they began gradually gathering around armed groups and political parties. He clarified that, during the Conference, participants widely discussed the Saada issue and agreed on building a State of national partnership between the different movements and a national partnership between all government institutions and bodies. They also agreed on the need for the State to have monopoly over weapons and control the entire country.

72. He argued that, as a result of the failure to activate the outcomes and build a civil State, parties had resorted to war. Yemen could overcome that crisis by establishing a representative technocratic Government or a Government of national partnership between all active political factions, without excluding any party.

DISCUSSIONS

73. A participant said that some persons were only interested in winning a battle. People should be guided towards what has been agreed upon without discussing the details, as everyone participating in the Dialogue had won on the global level but lost on the individual level. Regarding the issue of regions, participants at the National Dialogue had agreed upon a determining mechanism and the President had been requested to establish a committee engaging all factions, including the Partisans of God (Ansar Allah) group to discuss the issue. National consensus was achieved and a mechanism was established. There was also a need to help the Partisans of God group and the South Yemen Movement as they were new parties that had appeared in the political sphere to contribute to real change in Yemen; they were an integral part of the political scene according to the next phase entitlements and regulations. In turn, they should understand the provisions of those entitlements.

74. Another participant said that the Dialogue had resulted in a document described as one that would rank Yemen among the top States. However, he did not think that it was the desired document. The population of the south had not found any positive proposals in the document that would secure equality, even with the 20 and 11 points that had only been developed to create an enabling atmosphere in the south. With regard to security, he said that the situation had worsened compared with the situation during the mandate of the former president. Armed movements were the biggest threat facing the future of Yemen, regardless of their background. He added that it was difficult to see how the division into regions could be achieved given the current environment and the existence of a large part objecting the process.

75. One participant raised two questions. The first was related to the role of the Joint Meeting in implementing the National Dialogue outcomes. He asked whether every party should expand or restrict its
partnership circle or whether it would be more effective to collectively uphold the goals of the revolution. The second question was related to the contradiction justifying the use of weapons to secure change.

76. Another participant said that there was a call to form a historical bloc to monitor the National Dialogue outcomes, which should include all the Joint Meeting forces, movements and civil society organizations participating in the National Dialogue. The Joint Meeting seemed to be fully supporting the step, but that was not in fact the case.

77. One participant said that decision-making was the responsibility of political parties rather than the President and Prime Minister. However, consensus had not been achieved and the 1994 agreement had also failed. The leaders of political parties in the country were old, so how could there be demands for change when parties did not change. There was a need to agree on each issue and resolve it, contrary to what happened with the regions issue. He also tackled the issue of role distribution within parties, saying that partisan life was not rooted in Yemeni culture.

78. Another participant said that the participation of civil parties at the conference had been very weak, as was that of civil society; and that they could not achieve anything without the international community. Thus, the best solution would be pressure from the international community to enhance the role of those parties and enable them to implement the National Dialogue outcomes, because political parties were unable to induce effective change.

79. One participant said that, when the National Dialogue was held, parties had reached consensus according to the Dialogue structure and rules of procedure. However, the reality was very different. Some groups that had participated in the National Dialogue and agreed on the outcomes had contradicted their opinions on social media. The international community must support the outcomes so that consensus could last.

80. Mr. Yussuf El Kuraimi and Ms. Djamila Raja said that a civil bloc should be established comprising civil society organizations, activists and academics to take charge of implementing the National Dialogue outcomes and the 20 and 11 points. Two organizations had submitted to the Constitutional Committee their suggestions regarding federal State and constitutional principles, which was an encouraging initiative that should be fully implemented.

MAIN SPEAKERS’ RESPONSES

81. Mr. Ali El Bkyty suggested the dismissal of parties in the conflict from official government bodies, until their weapons issue was resolved. It was impossible for the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Islah parties to participate in government institutions, while other parties remained excluded under the pretext of carrying weapons.

82. Mr. Adib Nehmeh asked Mr. Ali El Bkyty if he considered that the Partisans of God were using violence only as a reaction to the failure to achieve consensus, rather than as a systematic and continuous strategy. Mr. Ali El Bkyty responded that weapon use was, to date, a reaction rather than a strategy.

Session VII: Development and the Way Forward – Needs and Ideas

83. The session was moderated by Mr. Mohamed al-Hawri who began his speech by thanking ESCWA for organizing the meeting. He discussed the economic situation in Yemen and highlighted the decline of economic indicators for poverty, unemployment and average income. The National Dialogue and economic facts showed that latent resources existed but the State was unable to exploit and develop them over the last decades. Those facts also indicated that opportunities for development and growth existed, but had not been tapped.
84. He stressed the main axes of development, namely social equity in the distribution of income and wealth; balance between the different sectors: public, private, cooperative and mixed ownership and civil sector; the foundations and pillars of the economy, including free economic activity, balance between sectors and encouraging innovation and competitiveness; the social responsibility of the State, as several outcomes clearly emphasized the need to give social responsibility great attention in the next phase through consumer protection, preventing monopoly or a set of outcomes (on unemployment and youth unemployment rates); public-private partnership as the private sector was the primary engine of growth and an institutional framework should be established to enhance that partnership; and the need for good governance for development. He argued that those were the key elements and the outcomes needed a development framework for the next phase.

85. Mr. Othman Kako expressed regret that the Yemen Workers Trade Union Federation, representing employees through the affiliated trade unions and the tripartite negotiating arbitration commissions, had not had a strong voice at the National Dialogue and had been represented by only two participants although it was a large federation, which gave the impression that political parties and institutions marginalized civil organizations and tried to dominate them.

86. He also argued that the Chamber of Commerce and trade unions were among the essential components of civil society. Civil society represented a transformative and economic community based on industry and independent national capital, relying on an economic industrial production chain rather than adopting a rentier economy. He also tackled the question of transition from independent union action to a more comprehensive action where the union would be working as part of the political system mechanism, while the rentier State had been in charge of all the tasks. He also highlighted the union’s democratic aspect, especially that it was the first union in the Arab region to declare a general and comprehensive strike in 1993. Finally, he expressed the hope that political parties would support that union.

87. Ms. Djamila Raja stressed the need for change within the Yemen Workers Trade Union Federation and the Union of Chamber of Commerce, as they were among the most important trade unions dealing with the issues of employment, business leaders’ environment and development. She also discussed gaps in the performance of ministries in development matters. She pointed out that donors were concerned about corruption, highlighted the issue of development and women and called for wider participation from women in all positions, not only the political sphere. She stressed the importance of education as an integral part of the development process and that of supporting technical education to serve the economy and development.

88. Mr. Yussuf El Kuraimi discussed the role that the private sector had played in recent years, as it had continually met with political fractions, parties and ambassadors of 10 countries and suggested, in 2011, an initiative that had not been taken into consideration due to the tense situation. Even in the worst circumstances, it had been able to provide all goods and services falling within its responsibility while goods and services falling within the State’s responsibility had been suspended. He highlighted that the private sector had suggested economic reforms in coordination with all actors. Some accused it of being out of touch, daring or exploitative, which was untrue even if it included, like other sectors, some corrupt groups.

89. He also said that the State was responsible for regulating and enforcing legislation, thus it had a role to play which should be clarified. During the National Dialogue, it had been agreed to adopt a free market system. It was also important to identify the role of that economy and how it could be applied to achieve social equity and human dignity. He also stressed the need to identify priority economic sectors according to available resources.

90. The speaker argued that change should begin within the administrative system that posed the biggest problem. It had been inherited from the old Ottoman system, as well as the Egyptian and British systems. It was therefore old and out of date. He emphasized the need for government financial entities to open accounts in all banks and transfer the salaries of administrative entities to banking entities, providing a financial basis for transforming the economy into a non-cash economy.
DISCUSSIONS

91. One participant expressed his hope that the Yemeni Business Club would be given a greater role, like the distinguished role of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Lebanon, despite existing political pressures.

92. Another participant said that it was not true that the agricultural sector was the primary sector and there was no room for agricultural development since land was limited. On the contrary, it had been reported that 70 per cent of the Yemeni population worked in agriculture; however that was the result of a lack of opportunities for a better life that forced them to stay in rural areas. He stressed the need to make the agricultural sector one of the main priorities and to attract investors to the industrial sector by providing basic infrastructure, particularly in terms of energy. He considered that the exploitation of natural gas in Yemen for electricity generation would enable the country to attract investors. Thus, he called upon the Business Club, the Chambers of Commerce and the Government to set future plans for its development and encouragement.

93. One participant said that lack of development was the cause of conflicts and wars.

94. Another participant said that political stability and security should be built on the stimulation of economic activity and investment, but that was not the case in Yemen. He praised the role of the private sector that was marginalized and lacked the appropriate environment to participate in the development process. He also highlighted the importance of its participation in the National Dialogue and its contribution to the outcomes related to the economy and development.

95. One participant warned of the increasing population in Yemen. He said that the private sector usually relied on fast profit business rather than long-term strategies because it did not trust the existing regime.

MAIN SPEAKERS’ RESPONSES

96. Mr. Yussuf El Kuraimi responded to some interventions, including the issue of priority economic sectors. He noted that 75 per cent of the Yemeni population was living in rural areas and 90 per cent depended on agriculture. The solution was the diversification of the rural economy which was an issue of priority, but did not entail neglecting the agricultural sector. He said that the service sector should be prioritized and that development should come first. Thus, the primary goal of any ruling party should be achieving development to guarantee their re-election and enhance their position.

97. The private sector had been accused of investing in fast profit business, which was untrue because it had led several projects that failed due to existing conditions. The private sector should be reformed in terms of components, structure and organizations. Weaknesses were the result of the problematic law of the Federation of Yemen Chambers of Commerce and Industry, which set that the Ministry of Industry and Trade would be the regulator of the Federation. It was therefore important to amend that law in a manner that could give the Federation more independence to act as a substitute. He concluded by suggesting the establishment of a civil bloc to work in parallel with the national bloc (the National Authority for Monitoring the Implementation of the National Dialogue Conference outcomes), stressing the importance of cooperation to ensure the implementation of the outcomes and translate them into projects.

Closing session

98. Mr. Adib Nehmeh summarized parts of the discussions and noted several challenges related to administrative and technical aspects, performance and economy patterns. Arab countries’ economies were capitalist in nature, and economic performance was governed by political performance. The call for separating politics and economy could be summarized by allowing the economy and production processes to work according to their own logic, so that economic mechanisms would not be forcibly substituted by
political mechanisms. Thus, the relationship pattern allowing for reasonable compromises and solutions could be achieved. Finally, he welcomed all the representatives of embassies that took part in the Meeting and asked all participants to submit their recommendations to ESCWA.

99. The Ambassador of Yemen thanked all participants. He also thanked ESCWA for its hard work that lasted over three months. He said that all recommendations were important and should be taken into consideration to make progress, and reminded the participants that they would be the main party to any action in the future.

100. Mohamed Ahmed al-Hawri thanked ESCWA for its valuable efforts and highlighted its future role in supporting the implementation of the National Dialogue outcomes. He also thanked the Ambassador of Yemen for the timely initiative and direction, and requested that he launch further initiatives. He also thanked participants for their responsible and effective attendance.

101. Mr. Tarik Alami thanked everyone on behalf of ESCWA and expressed his appreciation to Mr. Ali Ahmed El Dailmi for the organization of the Meeting. He encouraged everyone to contact ESCWA, through Mr. Hawri, on issues related to the National Dialogue or for any assistance. ESCWA assistance could include the following: organizing visits from Yemen to Arab countries to learn about their experiences in implementing similar outcomes; building capacities in the field of establishing and enhancing institutions and increasing the role of the State; and providing capacity-building for the development of indicators to monitor progress towards democratic governance and conducting relevant analyses and studies.

III. GOALS

102. The main objectives of the meeting were to present the Yemen National Dialogue as a regional case study to address the multiple challenges faced during a political transition; provide a platform for actors to discuss the necessary steps for the realization and implementation of the National Dialogue outcomes; and share Arab and international experiences in that area.

IV. ORGANIZATION OF WORK

A. DATE AND VENUE

103. The High-level Meeting on the Yemen National Dialogue was held in Beirut, on 11 and 12 June 2014.

B. OPENING

104. The meeting opened with a speech by Ms. Rima Khalaf, United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of ESCWA. She welcomed the intellectual and political participants from Yemen. She praised the achievements of the National Dialogue and indicated that any future success would depend on the ability to translate ideas and recommendations into actions.

105. Mr. Ali Ahmed El Dailmi, Ambassador of Yemen in Lebanon, noted that Yemen was building a new State where all citizens could enjoy freedom and justice, participate in governance and share the wealth despite the challenges and difficulties facing the country. He also highlighted that national security and stability could not be achieved without the participation of all Yemenis.

106. Mr. Abdel Karim al-Eryani, Foreign Policy Advisor to the President of the Yemen Republic and former Prime Minister, highlighted the role of the GCC initiative and its implementation mechanism in mitigating the risk of State collapse and a slide toward civil war.
C. PARTICIPANTS

107. The meeting was attended by ministers, deputies, senior officials, members of the Yemen National Dialogue, representatives of the Embassy of Yemen in Beirut, ambassadors and chargés d'affaires of several Arab and foreign embassies in Beirut (Egypt, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates), representatives of the Trade Union Training and Workers Education in Tunisia and a number of journalists from Tunisia and Yemen.

D. AGENDA

108. The meeting consisted of seven working sessions and a closing session. They were moderated by Mr. Adib Nehmeh, ESCWA Regional Advisor, and considered the following:

(a) Presentation of the overall context of the National Dialogue, role of national parties, international support, contributory factors to the success of the National Dialogue and challenges facing the implementation of the dialogue outcomes;

(b) Identification and acknowledgement of official delegation issues and National Dialogue responsibilities, and elaboration of the National Dialogue agenda and caveats;

(c) The need for the National Dialogue to tackle political polarization and communal and sectarian tensions accompanying the National Dialogue;

(d) Protection and implementation of the National Dialogue outcomes and consensus, especially in terms of transitional justice and investigating cases of infringement of human rights;

(e) The role of multilateral entities, in particular the United Nations, in supporting national unity and achieving national conciliation, transitional justice and the mechanisms set to guarantee the implementation of what was agreed upon;

(f) How to overcome the points of disagreement faced by the State-building team within the National Dialogue to establish a federal State system ensuring the implementation of the National Dialogue outcomes;

(g) How would national reconciliation be achieved in the light of continuous disagreement on the nature of the State and to which extent the mechanisms in place could be effective to attain consensus during and after the transitional phase;

(h) Establishment of social and political coalitions in the context of the existing balance of power to guarantee the progress towards the implementation of the Dialogue outcomes and identification of the role of the new constitution;

(i) Exchange of expertise in selected fields;

(j) Consensus achieved during the transitional phase;

(k) Challenges facing the implementation of the National Dialogue outcomes, alternative plans in the event of failure or partial success and the role of civil society and other components and national resources in ensuring the implementation of National Dialogue resolutions;

(l) Role of the public sector, particularly ministries, and of civil society organizations in addressing emerging priorities, with a view to mitigating potential conflicts.
Annex

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